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MONSANTO LECTURE
THE COMPLICATED BUSINESS OF STATE
SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS: AN
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE
Michael Heise
ABSTRACT
Proponents of judicial elections and related campaign activities emphasize
existing First Amendment jurisprudence as well as similarities linking publiclyelected state judges and other publicly-elected state officials. Opponents focus on
judicial campaign contributions’ corrosive effects, including their potential to
unduly influence judicial outcomes. Using a comprehensive data set of 2,345
business-related cases decided by state supreme courts across all fifty states
between 2010–12, judicial election critics, including Professor Joanna Shepherd,
emphasize the potential for bias and find that campaign contributions from
business sources to state supreme court judicial candidates corresponded with
candidates’ pro-business votes as justices. While Shepherd’s main findings
generally replicate, additional (and alternative) analyses introduce new findings
that raise complicating wrinkles for Shepherd’s strong normative claims.
Findings from this study illustrate that efforts to influence judicial outcomes are
not the exclusive domain of business interests. That is, judicial campaign
contributions from non- (and anti-) business interests increase the probability of
justices’ votes favoring non-business interests. As a result, critiques of judicial
elections cannot properly rely exclusively on the influence of business interests.
Moreover, that both business and non-business interests can successfully
influence judicial outcomes through campaign contributions point in different
(and possibly conflicting) normative directions. On the one hand, even if one
agrees that the judicial branch qualitatively differs from the political and executive
branches in terms of assessing campaign contributions’ proper role, that the
potential to influence judicial outcomes is available to any interest group (willing
to invest campaign contributions) complicates popular critiques of judicial
elections. On the other hand, the same empirical findings also plausibly
strengthen critiques of judicial elections, especially for those who view the judicial
domain differently than other political domains.

Professor, Cornell Law School. This Article is the written version of the Monsanto
Lecture, delivered at Valparaiso University Law School on February 16, 2017. Joanna
Shepherd, Dawn M. Chutkow, Nicole A. Heise, and Nicholas Stephanopoulos provided
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Debates over state judicial selection methods have persisted over time
and increased in ferocity.1 Questions about how best to reconcile two
desired goals reside at the core of such debates: judicial independence
from and accountability to those bound by court rulings. Conventional
wisdom typically links judicial appointments with enhanced
independence and judicial elections with enhanced accountability. 2
Among an array of selection methods, many states select their supreme
court justices through popular election and some have done so since the
mid-nineteenth century.3 While motivations for those states that use
popular election as a judicial selection model vary, the motivations
include a general impulse to increase judges’ accountability to the people
whom their decisions influence.4
States opting for judicial elections invariably confront important
campaign finance questions for judicial candidates.5 As Professor Kritzer
observes, “[t]he elephant in the room regarding the impact of judicial
elections on judicial decisions is the question of whether judges who must
stand for election . . . are influenced by campaign contributions.”6 Legal
contests over elections and campaign spending have forced the Supreme
Court to consider the potentially corrosive effects of money in the electoral
process and, within the bounds of the First Amendment, how concerns
about corruption might be addressed.7 Similar and concurrent litigation
over state judicial elections and campaign spending has imposed upon the
Court derivative questions about whether its concerns about the role of
money in elections must shift when the elected public official is a judge.8

See JED H. SHUGERMAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL
AMERICA (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012) (discussing
the history of judicial selection methods within the states).
2
See id. at 6 (providing a link between judicial appointment and accountability as
described by Alexis de Tocqueville).
3
See, e.g., id. at Ch. 3 (giving a helpful summary of the state’s judicial selection process).
4
Id.
5
See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Impact of Judicial Elections on Judicial Decisions, 12 ANN.
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 353, 364 (2016) (showing the impacts of campaign contributions on judicial
decisions and providing evidence of direct and indirect influences).
6
Id.
7
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010) (considering
concerns about electoral corruption). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 104–05, 107–08
(1976) (striking down campaign expenditure limits).
8
See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (upholding limits on
judicial candidates’ ability to personally solicit campaign funds). See also Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (showing that due process requires recusal when a
judicial candidate receives contributions in excessive amounts); Republican Party of
1
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Even those not particularly bothered in the abstract by submitting
judicial candidates (along with judges seeking retention) to the electoral
process understand that the interaction between campaign spending and
judicial elections heightens potential tensions. 9 While early judicial
elections may have been comparatively inexpensive affairs, judicial
elections today, by contrast, are frequently quite expensive. 10 As a result
of a transformation of campaign spending and its role in judicial elections,
“judges spend significant amounts of time and energy raising money.” 11
As judicial campaign spending increased, the number of campaign
contributors increased which, in turn, increased the probability that an
elected judge would hear a case involving litigants (or attorneys) who
contributed to presiding judges’ campaigns. 12 How one understands
these tensions frequently pivots largely on one’s own perspective. Where
some see modern trends in judicial elections as “healthy,” others
increasingly see “nightmarish” problems.13
These latent tensions frequently emerge in a judicial election context
that features pro- or anti-business campaign spending invested with an
eye toward judicial engagement with existing or contemplated tort reform
legislation. Writing about the 1980s, judicial election scholars noted an
emergence of a “new-style” of state supreme court campaigns that
increasingly resembled traditional political campaigns in tone, content,
and methods.14 These same political scientists noted how judicial
campaigns began to reach and engage voters on even the “more prosaic
issues such as tort law.”15 More to the point, “tort reform,” a persistent
flash-point for pro- and anti-business interests and, consequently, an
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (concluding that the announce clause in the
canon of judicial conduct violates the First Amendment).
9
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (describing how campaign spending can fuel
corruption or the appearance of corruption). See also Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1659–60
(examining how campaign contributions in judicial elections can jeopardize judiciary
integrity).
10
See Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 638 (2015)
(describing the increase in spending on judicial elections).
11
Id.
12
See id. (highlighting an example in which two-thirds of the cases heard by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court between 2008–09 had a campaign contributor as the party,
lawyer, or law firm).
13
See David Schultz, Minnesota Republican Party v. White and the Future of State Judicial
Selection, 69 ALB. L. REV. 985, 985 (2006) (describing how the future of judicial elections, such
as in Texas, may be nightmarish considering its increased politicization).
14
See, e.g., Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, “New Style” Judicial Campaigns and the
Voters: Economic Issues and Union Members in Ohio, 45 WEST. POL. QUART. 921, 922 (1992)
(noting the emergence of the “new style” of judicial elections in which candidates are more
likely to incorporate policy into their campaigns).
15
Id. at 944–45.
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important political issue in many states, is “fought not only in state
legislatures but also in state supreme courts.”16 Professors Kang and
Shepherd characterize tort reform issues as business contributors’
“primary focus in state judicial races.”17 One predictable consequence in
states that elect judges is that “much of the money contributed in judicial
races tends to be given by those interested in the shape of tort law.”18
While acknowledging that “any interest group might exert influence
over the judiciary,” Kang and Shepherd’s work focuses on the influence
of pro-business judicial campaign contributions on judicial votes in
business cases.19 Professors Kang and Shepherd attribute their focus on
business’ potential influence on judicial outcomes to the business lobby’s
unique ability to do so. This study seeks to broaden Kang and Shepherd’s
focus by exploring the possible influence of non- (and anti-) business
contributions as well.
Whether judicial campaign contributions influence judicial votes and
case outcomes is, at one crucial level, an empirical question. In contrast,
how best to characterize publicly-elected judges and their non-judicial
elected counterparts is better understood as a normative question. To a
large degree, how one understands a publicly-elected state judge’s
function informs one’s assessments about judicial elections and judicial
campaign spending. Proponents of judicial elections, such as Professor
Hall, emphasize the similarities that link elected state supreme court
justices and other elected officials.20 For critics of judicial elections,
however, this is precisely the problem. Specifically, for many judicial
election critics the similar ways in which campaign spending influences
judicial, legislative, and executive elected officials contribute to problems
with judicial elections because of the potentially fundamental ways in
which the judicial branch differs from the legislative and executive
branches.21 Consequently, many of the arguments that distinguish
Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1483, 1488
(2005).
17
Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 85 (2011).
18
See Champagne, supra note 16, at 1488 (“[i]t is state judge selection that produces the
major battles between economic interests that are concerned with a state’s tort law”).
19
Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 85.
20
See MELINDA G. HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES: HOW CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING INFLUENCES
STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS 126 (Stanford University Press, 2015) (discussing how
studying supreme court elections is essential to understanding the relationship between
campaign contributions and judicial votes).
21
See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial Elections, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 929, 930 (2016) (addressing how the similarities between state supreme court elections
and elections in other offices are why critics believe a problem exists). But see James Sample,
Democracy at the Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality, 66
16
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campaign spending in the judicial and non-judicial electoral contexts
pivot on distinguishing publicly-elected state judges from other publiclyelected officials.22
Even the U.S. Supreme Court appears genuinely conflicted over how
to frame elected judicial actors in the campaign context.23 On the one
hand, in striking down a Minnesota law limiting judicial candidates’
political speech, the Court implicitly recognized the First Amendment’s
similar purchase when it came to pure political speech, whether in the
judicial, legislative, or executive electoral contexts.24 In so doing, the White
decision in 2002 emphasizes the Court’s implicit recognition of similarities
between publicly-elected judges and the non-judicial counterparts.25
In 2015, however, the Court upheld a Florida prohibition on a judicial
candidate’s direct campaign fundraising solicitations. 26 In contrast to the
White decision, the Williams-Yulee decision suggests that the Court (or at
least five Justices) views judicial candidates differently than other political
candidates.27 Specifically, while the White opinion implicitly frames
judicial candidates as functionally equal to other political candidates for
purposes of free speech protections, the Williams-Yulee opinion, by
contrast, takes another tact by endeavoring to distinguish publicly-elected
state judges from other publicly-elected officials in the campaign
contributions’ context.28 The Court’s effort to restrict judicial candidates’
fundraising in Williams-Yulee rests uneasily with the Court’s prior decision
in Buckley where it functionally construed campaign contributions and
spending as core political speech. 29 Indeed, critics of the Williams-Yulee
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 727, 756–57 (2011) (arguing that differences in democratic
expectations in the courts and traditional political arenas justify treating campaign spending
in judicial elections differently than in political elections).
22
See generally Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 797 (2002) (Justice
Stevens dissenting) (describing judges and public officials’ differing roles).
23
Compare Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015) (upholding limits on
judicial candidates’ ability to personally solicit campaign funds), with White, 536 U.S. at 774
(explaining that the announce clause in the canon of judicial conduct violates the First
Amendment).
24
See White, 536 U.S. at 783–84 (holding that Minnesota cannot prohibit judicial candidates
from announcing their views on legal and political issues).
25
See id. at 787–88 (comparing the First Amendment election rights of judges with those
of their non-judicial counterparts).
26
See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673 (reasoning that when a state has an interest in
preserving public confidence in the judiciary the state can adopt narrowly tailored
restrictions to a judicial candidate’s solicitations).
27
See id. at 1662 (“Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of
the ballot.”).
28
See, e.g., id. (holding that the First Amendment does not preclude all restrictions on
judicial solicitation of campaign funds). See also White, 536 U.S. at 773 (opining that the
announce clause is not tailored to serve many interests).
29
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (striking down campaign expenditure limits).
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decision quickly noted how the Court’s analysis applies a “heavily
watered-down version of strict scrutiny analysis”—particularly as it
relates to the narrowly tailored prong—to enable the Court to reach its
outcome yet maintain the outward appearance of having applied strict
judicial scrutiny.30
At a conceptual level, the contested issues run even deeper. Whether
elected state judges are, unlike their elected counterparts in the executive
and legislative branches, charged with a counter-majoritarian function
that is structurally threatened by judicial elections resides at the heart of
what divides judicial election proponents and critics. Moreover, more
recent Court decisions imply a growing unease with “protecting the
integrity of the judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an
impartial judiciary.”31 As well, the Court wants elected judges to steer
clear of creating an appearance of impropriety within a constitutional
regime that permits judicial candidate campaign speech and some forms
of campaign fundraising.32 Finally, within a context noted for inevitably
conflicting principles and impulses, it remains unclear whether the divide
separating judicial election proponents and opponents can be bridged at
all and, if it can, what role empirical scholarship might play in informing
arguments.
Two likely causal pathways help explain relations between judicial
campaign contributions and judges’ votes that reflect contributors’
interests.33 One includes selection bias for the sub-pool of candidates who
prevail in their judicial elections. Specifically, prevailing judges may
already possess a preference for (or against) business interests. Another,
more subtle, causal mechanism involves judges who, while otherwise
agnostic about business interests, may favor (or disfavor) business
interests in their votes with an eye towards securing future campaign
contributions in future judicial elections. While this study’s data and
research design are unable to identify which casual pathway might be
salient, this study can assess whether and, if so, to what degree campaign
contributions from business and non-business interests correlate with
judges’ votes in business cases.
The data set used in this study merges state supreme court decisions
by 439 state supreme court justices in 2,345 concluded business-related
cases decided between 2010–12 across all fifty states with information on
30
Noah B. Lindell, Comment, Williams-Yulee and the Anomaly of Campaign Finance Law,
126 YALE L.J. 1577, 1577 (2017).
31
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
32
See id. at 1664 (explaining that an appearance of impropriety would prompt one to
question a judge’s impartiality).
33
See, e.g., Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 72 (discussing the two pathways that
explain the relationship between judicial campaigns and votes).
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more than 175,000 contribution records that detail every reported
contribution to every sitting state supreme court justice in each elected
state supreme court justice’s most recent election. Judicial campaign
contributions to judges were categorized based on their source as
representing a pro-business, non-business, or anti-business interest.
The central results from my initial analyses comport with Professor
Shepherd’s earlier findings about relations between judicial campaign
contributions from pro-business interests and judges’ pro-business
votes.34 Additional analyses also identify a new, though related, finding:
campaign contributions from non- (and anti-) business interests correlate
with judges’ anti-business votes. Evidence that non- and anti-business
interests also correlate with desired judicial votes is important partly
because it challenges Kang and Shepherd’s critical assumption about
business contributors’ “unique” abilities when it comes to influencing
judicial votes.35
The influence of non- and anti-business campaign contributions on
judicial votes both challenges and complicates traditional critiques against
judicial elections that focus on claims about business interests’ undue
influence. That is, evidence that business and non-business interests may
successfully influence judicial outcomes through campaign contributions
points in different (and possibly conflicting) normative directions. Even
if one agrees that the judicial branch qualitatively differs from the political
and executive branches in terms of assessing campaign contributions’
proper role, that the potential to influence judicial outcomes is available
to potentially any discrete interest group (willing to invest campaign
contributions) dulls the dominant, business-centric public criticisms of
judicial elections. Of course, findings from this study also plausibly
strengthen critiques of judicial elections overall, especially from those who
view the judicial domain as distinct from other political domains.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part II briefly maps out the major
judicial selection models in the United States for federal and state courts,
as well as the broad legal terrain that structures contests arising out of the
judicial campaign context.36 Part III summarizes the leading empirical
work, with particular emphasis on Shepherd’s 2013 paper that this study
sets out to expand. The data and methodology are described in Part IV.
Results are both presented and discussed in Part V. Part VI concludes.

34
See infra Part V.B (comparing results with Shepherd’s earlier model that looked at the
relations between judicial campaign contributions and judges’ votes).
35
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 85 (discussing business groups’ unique ability
to influence judges).
36
See infra Part II (discussing judicial election variation and how judicial elections have
changed over time).
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II. JUDICIAL SELECTION AND EVOLVING LEGAL TERRAIN
While this paper focuses on empirical and normative issues raised by
campaign contributions in state judicial elections, it remains important to
note that alternative methods of judicial selection exist. Equally important
is that the legal terrain shaping efforts to regulate judicial candidates’
conduct and speech, as well as judges’ conduct on the bench, continues to
evolve over time.
A. Judicial Selection Variation
Many state judges are elected to the bench, and the mechanisms used
by states range from partisan elections to non-partisan retention elections.
The selection mechanism for Article III judges (and justices) in the federal
context, by contrast, involves presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation.37 Once commissioned, federal judges enjoy life tenure,
subject only to impeachment for conduct that falls below “good
behavior.”38 By removing federal judges’ appointments from direct
electoral processes and pressures, the Founders sought to better insulate
federal judges from the ever-shifting political winds of the day, promote
independent judgment, and, it is thought (indeed, perhaps even
assumed), to enhance justice.
However, appointment-based (or even merit-based) judicial selection
models are far from immune to criticisms. Despite important differences
separating elective and appointive judicial models, the role of politics
persists. Indeed, President Obama’s effort to promote Judge Garland from
the appeals court to the U.S. Supreme Court during the president’s final
year in office and many leading Republican senators’ public declarations
of their refusal to meet with any appointee so close to a general election
have only renewed public focus and debate on judicial selection as well as
politics’ proper role.39 Setting aside separation of powers concerns and
intra-branch rivalries, such debates imply that questions about the role of

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2.
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1. See also Edward Lazarus, Life Tenure for Federal Judges: Should
It Be Abolished?, CNN (Dec. 10 2004), http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/12/10/
lazarus.federal.judges/ [https://perma.cc/F7L9-5QLM] (showing that Americans’ views on
a judge’s tenure are changing).
39
See Paul Callan, Paul Callan: The Best Republican Option?, CNN (Mar. 17, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/16/opinions/merrick-garland-supreme-court-obamaopinion-roundup/index.html [https://perma.cc/57P8-T5D4] (explaining why the
Republicans refused to meet with any appointee so close to a presidential election).
37
38
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politics when it comes to selecting judges, even appointed judges,
persist.40
It has become received political rhetoric that “unelected” federal
judges make decisions that inform public life and shape the polity in
critical ways. To be sure, direct access to judicial selections by those bound
by judicial decisions—through direct or retention elections—simply does
not exist in the federal sphere. Moreover, one critical constitutional check
on federal judges, impeachment, has been invoked only rarely and
typically incident to some of the more egregious cases of judicial
misconduct.41
However, citizens are afforded some ability to pick their brand of
justice through their participation in presidential and congressional
elections.42 Indeed, with the Robert Bork hearings serving as something
of a political watershed moment, subsequent presidential political
campaigns have often featured promises about what kind of judges (and
justices) the candidate would nominate if elected.43 Similar campaign
rhetoric is heard in senatorial campaigns as well. Thus, even in the federal
judicial space, while perhaps only indirectly, citizens nonetheless possess
some degree of influence over the selection of judges.
In addition, empirical assertions about the comparative advantages
(or disadvantages) of an elected judiciary are advanced too often as if
counterfactual data do not exist. How various states select state supreme
court justices, however, supplies quite helpful, if imperfect, variation.
While federal judge selection excludes any direct electoral component,
judge selection methods across the fifty states vary considerably and,
important to this study, include judicial elections.44
Scholarly attention to state courts and state judge selection is
warranted in its own right as more than ninety percent of the nation’s

40
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 125–26 (depicting how politics will always have
a crucial role in judicial elections).
41
See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior” Tenure, 79 YALE L.J.
1475, 1507 (1970) (noting that impeachment is only used in very serious cases involving
judicial misbehavior).
42
See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 73,
78 (Yale University Press, Nota Bene ed. 2001) (describing the democratic process and how
people can elect leaders that reflect their opinions).
43
See Nina Totenberg, Robert Bork’s Supreme Court Nomination Changed Everything, Maybe
Forever, NPR (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2012/12/19/
167645600/robert-borks-supreme-court-nomination-changed-everything-maybe-forever
[https://perma.cc/REH2-UDTG] (explaining the partisan divide resulting from Bork’s
failed Supreme Court nomination).
44
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 76–77 (stating that judge selection methods differ
considerably across the country).
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judicial work is performed in state courts, 45 and approximately ninety
percent of all state court judges (and state supreme court justices)
participate in some form of direct electoral activity. 46 Insofar as campaign
contributions remain one form of constitutionally-protected core political
speech, albeit a regulated one, it is not surprising (indeed, inevitable) that
state judicial candidates attract campaign funding.
What might surprise some, however, is how the magnitude of
campaign spending in state judicial elections has increased over time,
particularly since the 1980s.47 As Professors Kang and Shepherd note,
since “money buys things,” questions about what judicial campaign
contributions might be “purchasing” warrant close attention.48 Various
threats posed by judicial campaign contributions to the fair administration
of justice (or even the appearance of fairness) have been considered in
detail by others.49 After exploring the efficacy of “purchasing” judicial
outcomes in the state context from an empirical perspective, this Article
goes on to consider whether the state judicial experience differs in material
ways from efforts to influence judicial selection in the federal context.
At this juncture it is important to make clear what this Article does
not consider. I take as a given that judicial canons, state rules, norms, etc.,
correctly regulate against any judicial misconduct, which would include
any judge who bases a legal decision or ruling exclusively in response to
a judicial campaign contribution.50 Such activity offends any fair-minded
understanding of what justice might mean. Moreover, I also assume that
a well-functioning judicial recusal doctrine, despite its limitations,
provides one important instrument that can reduce conflicts between a
judge’s private interests and the administration of impartial justice. By
pushing to one side efforts to, quite literally, “purchase” a judge (or a
judicial outcome) through judicial campaign contributions, I focus instead
on the empirical and normative contours of the more granular and
nuanced constituent efforts to “purchase” a judicial philosophy or
perspective through judicial campaign contributions.

See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 976 (2001)
(examining the variety of judicial elections and that most state court judges are elected).
46
See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1091
(2007) (app. 2) (stating that “over 90 percent of judges reach the bench by appointment to fill
vacancies”).
47
See id. at 1079–80 (describing campaign spending since the 1980’s, which have evolved
due to changes in advertising techniques).
48
Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign
Finance, 86 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1240 (2013).
49
See, e.g., SHUGERMAN, supra note 1 (showing the different views on judicial contribution
funding).
50
See, e.g., id. (describing the assumptions involved in his analysis).
45
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B. Judicial Elections’ Evolving Legal Terrain
Understanding how the interaction between campaign spending and
judicial elections heightens potential tensions requires an understanding
of relevant (and evolving) legal doctrines in this particular context. The
relevant doctrines include those relating to the First Amendment and
campaign speech and spending and, more recently, how judicial
campaign contributions implicate a judge’s recusal obligations.
The Supreme Court’s Buckley v. Valeo51 decision in 1976, construing
political campaign contributions and expenditures as core political speech
(although allowing for regulations on contributions), continues to wield
important influence. In 2002, the Court explored the contours of core
political speech rights in the judicial electoral context. 52 In White, the Court
struck down a Minnesota Supreme Court canon of judicial conduct that
prohibited candidates seeking elected judicial office from “announc[ing]
his or her views on disputed legal or political issues” on First Amendment
grounds.53
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia began by noting that strict judicial
scrutiny was warranted as the Minnesota canon sought a content-based
speech restriction that implicated the First Amendment’s core.54 While
conceding the state’s interest in the impartial administration of justice as
well as in promoting its appearance may well be “compelling,” the Court
nonetheless concluded that the speech restriction was not sufficiently
narrowly tailored.55 The Court also noted that the Minnesota judicial
canon itself separately treated efforts by judicial candidates to announce
their particular views on legal issues from candidates’ efforts to “pledge
or promise” to deliver specific judicial outcomes upon election to the
bench.56 While the White opinion expressly side-steps any resolution
involving the latter issue,57 the Court’s acknowledgement of it hints at
deeper and more uncomfortable complexities.
Nested within the Court’s opinion, however, and expressly engaged
by the dissenting Justices, is the assumption that “judicial candidates
should have the same freedom ‘to express themselves on matters of
See 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (striking down campaign expenditure limits).
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 768, 768 (2002) (analyzing the
constitutionality of the Minnesota judicial canon’s attempt to prevent judicial candidates
from announcing their views on certain issues).
53
See id.
54
See id. at 774 (stating that the Court of Appeals properly decided that strict scrutiny was
the proper test to determine the constitutionality of the speech restriction).
55
See id. at 788.
56
See id. at 770 (explaining Minnesota’s judicial canon).
57
See id. (determining that the court “express[ed] no view” on the issue of promising
particular judicial outcomes).
51
52
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current public importance’ as do all other elected officials.” 58 That is,
while five Justices implicitly refused to analytically distinguish judicial
candidates from candidates for other publicly-elected offices, at least four
dissenting Justices advanced such a distinction, noting “the critical
difference between the work of the judge and the work of other public
officials.”59 To the dissenting Justices, their impulse that “[j]udges are not
politicians”60 carried over to those state judges and justices who must
submit themselves to the political processes and the electorate.
Having decided that political campaign contributions and spending
constitute core political speech in Buckley and that state judicial candidates
were free to engage with contested legal and political issues in White, in
2009 the Supreme Court was asked to speak directly to some practical
problems posed by judicial campaign contributions, specifically how an
elected judge’s campaign contributions implicated recusal obligations. 61
In Caperton, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time Due Process
concerns arising out of the potential for judicial bias flowing from
campaign contributions from a litigant appearing before a judge who was
the recipient of financial support from that litigant.62 While Caperton is
technically a “recusal” case, the salient facts make clear its relevance to the
challenges arising out of campaign contributions to judges running for
election to the bench.
The key facts in Caperton are both straightforward and compelling. 63
In 1998, Harmon Mining Company successfully sued A.T. Massey Coal
Company for a contract breach.64 In 2002, A.T. Massey Coal Company
appealed the $50 million trial court verdict favoring Harmon Mining. 65
Between the trial court decision and a subsequent appeal to West
Virginia’s Supreme Court, Don Blankenship, Massey Coal Company’s
CEO, spent $3 million in 2004 to help ensure Brent Benjamin’s election to

58
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 768, 797 (2002) (Stevens, J., Souter, J.,
Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., dissenting).
59
Id. at 798. See also id. at 797 (explaining the rationale behind the dissent of the four
Justices).
60
See id. at 821 (critiquing the dissent’s reasoning).
61
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009).
62
See id. at 889–90 (concluding that application of the Due Process Clause will only be
confined to rare instances).
63
See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (Doubleday, 1st ed. 2008) (citing the relationship
between the book THE APPEAL and the Caperton case). Indeed, while formally set in a
fictitious Mississippi town, it is likely that the political and legal controversy surrounding
the Caperton case provided some inspiration for the 2008 best-selling novel. Id.
64
See Chris Dickerson, Caperton-Massey Saga (Mar. 29, 2012), https://wvrecord.com/
stories/510601919-caperton-massey-saga [https://perma.cc/74DE-FDKG] (describing the
procedural history of the Caperton case).
65
See id. (describing A.T. Massey’s appeal of the $50 million adverse verdict).
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the West Virginia Supreme Court.66 Four years after his election to the
West Virginia Supreme Court, Justice Benjamin refused calls for his
recusal from hearing and participating in A.T. Massey’s appeal.67 Not
only did he refuse recusal motions, but on two separate occasions Justice
Benjamin joined a 3-2 majority that ruled in favor of A.T. Massey and
reversed the original $50 million trial verdict.68 Harmon Mining Company
then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that Justice Benjamin’s
participation was improper.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Harmon Mining and, writing for
the Court, Justice Kennedy’s opinion emphasizes the pending litigation
that coincided with the timing of Blankenship’s significant campaign
contribution to (now) Justice Benjamin as well as Blakenship’s personal
financial interest in a favorable disposition of the A. T. Massey case. 69 As
a consequence, Justice Kennedy concluded that, in such a circumstance,
Justice Benjamin should have recused himself from participating in the
Massey litigation due to an unacceptable “probability of bias” which
constituted a threat to the Constitution’s Due Process Clause.70
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Roberts emphasized the uncertainty that
necessarily flows from the Court’s departure from two clear situations
that require a judicial recusal: “[w]hen the judge has a financial interest
in the outcome of the case, and when the judge is trying a defendant for
certain criminal contempts.”71 Justice Roberts voiced deep skepticism
about judicial efforts to define when a “probability of bias” exists and, if it
does, what specific probabilistic level warrants judicial recusal.72 To
underscore his skepticism, Justice Roberts went on to list forty specific
questions, many salient to the judicial campaign contribution context,
which, in the minds of four dissenting justices, raise uncertainty about
whether a judge should recuse under the guidance provided by the
Owing to the increased uncertainty
Court’s Caperton decision.73

See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873 (describing Don Blankenship’s campaign contributions to
Brent Benjamin).
67
See id. at 873–74 (stating that Benjamin refused to recuse himself because there was no
information that he would be “anything but fair and impartial”).
68
See id. at 874–75.
69
See id. at 886 (addressing the reasons that Justice Benjamin should have recused himself
from the case).
70
See id. at 887 (articulating a “probability of bias” recusal standard).
71
See id. at 890 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
72
See id. at 890–91 (indicating that the “probability of bias” standard is difficult to define
in a coherent manner, thus making it unclear when recusal is constitutionally required).
73
See id. at 893–98 (citing a list of questions to consider when determining if recusal is
necessary).
66
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surrounding judicial recusal created by the Caperton decision, Justice
Roberts predicted a flood of recusal motions.74
Importantly, the Court’s opinion and the dissents in Caperton
implicitly assume an empirical relation between campaign contributions
to judicial candidates and their subsequent votes as judges. On one level,
such an assumption makes obvious—indeed, intuitive—sense.75 In the
political realm, not only is such a relation between campaign contributions
and political candidates assumed, but is frequently expected, if not
demanded, by contributors.76
However, it is also important not to ignore complicating wrinkles in
Caperton that are far less appreciated because they run against and cloud
an admittedly compelling public narrative. While the Caperton litigation
and events involving Massey Coal and West Virginia Supreme Court
Justice Benjamin are often pointed to as an “easy” example of all that can
go wrong with judicial elections, Justice Benjamin’s actual voting record
on cases involving the Massey Coal Company (and other, related, Massey
Energy holdings) confounds the received public narrative. 77 According to
a West Virginia Supreme Court press release, prepared by that court’s
administrative office, during his initial four years on the Court, “Justice
Benjamin voted against the [legal] interests of Massey Energy or its
subsidiary 81.6 percent of the time.”78 Before the Caperton litigation, in
other cases that also involved Massey Coal none of the parties petitioned

See id. at 902 (warning that the result of the Court’s decision could be a flood of
litigation). It warrants note that, thus far, the scholarly consensus is that Chief Justice
Robert’s prediction of a flood of litigation activity stimulated by Justice Kennedy’s opinion
in Caperton has been largely unfulfilled. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown: Judicial
Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 233 (2010) (stating that there has not been a
flood of litigation after Caperton).
75
See id. at 1438 (analyzing the higher likelihood that a Republican judge would cast a
partisan vote).
76
See Mark Schmitt, What if You Had as Much Political Influence as a Billionaire?, CNN (Feb.
16, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/16/opinion/schmitt-politics-money/index.html
[https://perma.cc/78CT-9CVY] (considering the increased ability of the wealthy to get
political influence through large campaign donations).
77
See West Virginia State Supreme Court News, Summary of Chief Justice Benjamin’s
Dispositive Voting Record Regarding Massey Energy Cases from 01/01/2005 to 12/31/2008 (Mar.
31, 2009), http://www.courtswv.gov/public-resources/press/releases/2009-releases/
march2_09.htm [https://perma.cc/E23F-PAW8] (outlining Justice Benjamin’s voting history
in Massey cases).
78
Id. The analysis of Justice Benjamin’s Massey Energy-related voting record excludes
votes on such non-dispositive matters as motions for time extensions, exceeding page
limitations on briefs, etc. See id. (stating that the list of Justice Benjamin’s voting record on
cases involving Massey does not include any votes on non-dispositive matters). See also
Roland D. Rotunda, Codifying Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 95,
103 (2010) (explaining Justice Benjamin’s decisions on other cases involving Massey Energy).
74
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for Justice Benjamin’s recusal.79 Thus, despite Justice Benjamin’s
complicated judicial voting record in cases involving Massey Energy (and
Massey Coal company), the prevailing public narrative surrounding
Justice Benjamin characterizes him (fairly or not) as having been “bought”
by Blankenship to serve on the West Virginia Supreme Court on behalf of
Massey Coal’s interests.80
A more recent decision in Williams-Yulee further evidences the Court’s
growing wariness about and unease with practical implications flowing
from elected judges.81 In Williams-Yulee, the Court upheld Florida’s Code
of Judicial Conduct which prohibits state judicial candidates from
personally soliciting campaign funds. 82 During her judicial campaign,
Williams-Yulee sent a mass-mailing fundraising letter to potential
contributors and then posted her letter to a campaign website.83 Although
she lost her election, the Florida Bar initiated a disciplinary review,
concluded that she violated Florida’s Canon of Judicial Ethics, and fined
Williams-Yulee $1,860.30.84
Williams-Yulee challenged the Florida Canon of Judicial Ethics’
prohibition of a judicial candidate’s direct, personal solicitation of
campaign funds on First Amendment grounds. While only a plurality of
the Justices concluded that Florida’s canon triggered traditional strict
judicial scrutiny, the Court administered what at least one commentator
has described as a “heavily watered-down version of strict scrutiny.” 85
Concluding that the canon’s goal of “protecting the integrity of the
judiciary and maintaining the public’s confidence in an impartial
judiciary” was, indeed, a compelling interest,86 and that a restriction on
personal solicitation activities so as to avoid an “appearance of

See, e.g., U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Helton, 631 S.E.2d 559, 577 (W. Va. 2005) (upholding
the constitutionality of several coal taxes Massey challenged). See also Helton v. Reed, 638
S.E.2d 160, 166 (W. Va. 2006) (reflecting Justice Benjamin’s vote against Massey companies
at the merits stage).
80
See Richard Gillespie, Buying a Judicial Seat for Appeal: Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Company, Inc., is Right Out of a John Grisham Novel, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
309, 315 (2010) (advancing the argument that Justice Benjamin had been “bought” by
Massey).
81
See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (upholding a Florida
restriction on campaign contributions in judicial elections).
82
See id. at 1663 (stating that judicial candidates should not be allowed to personally solicit
campaign contributions).
83
See id. (detailing Williams-Yulee’s solicitation of campaign funds).
84
See id. at 1663–64 (explaining the application of Florida’s Canon of Judicial Ethics Canon
7(C)(1) and Williams-Yulee’s fine for violation). Florida’s Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
7(C)(1) resembles the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
85
See Lindell, supra note 30, at 1577 (criticizing the version of scrutiny the Court applied).
86
Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
79
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impropriety” was narrowly tailored, the Court went on to uphold
Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1).87
Setting aside the Court’s specific application of the narrowly tailored
prong analysis in Williams-Yulee,88 as a descriptive matter it remains
accurate to note that when the Court applies traditional First Amendment
doctrine—and the strict scrutiny test in particular—to campaign finance
restrictions in the context of non-judicial elections, the results are
complicated and mixed. For example, when it comes to non-judicial
candidates’ ability to fundraise or spend their own money, First
Amendment rights typically prevail, though members of Congress are not
permitted to solicit funds from their governmental offices.89 Despite this
palpable trend, in applying these general principles to state judicial
candidates, the Court departed somewhat from its usual path in WilliamsYulee. Notably, the Court appeared to diminish concerns about how
Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) burdened judicial candidates’ speech rights in an
almost transparently self-conscious manner.90
The dissenters in Williams-Yulee rightly pointed out that Florida’s
Canon 7(C)(1) bans direct candidate financial solicitations in any form and
to any person.91 That is, the Canon’s prohibition is not necessarily limited
to only those solicitations likely to create any appearance of impropriety.
Florida’s ban also applies even where those solicited might never have a
legal interest in a case decided before the soliciting judicial candidate. 92
Consequently, Williams-Yulee implies that the Court’s concerns about the
87
See, e.g., Note, Freedom of Speech—Judicial Campaign Speech—Williams-Yulee v. Florida
Bar, 129 HARV. L. REV. 231, 232 (2015) (critiquing of the Court’s First Amendment analysis of
regulations of judicial elections). Language in Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) resembles language
in rules for federal appellate judges and justices. See also Code of Conduct for United States
Judges, Canon 2 (Mar. 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol02a-ch02_
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW65-3V5W] (“[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities”).
88
See 135 S. Ct. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) as “about
as narrowly tailored as a burlap bag”).
89
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (expressing that
a prohibition on corporate expenditure violates the First Amendment). See also U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON ETHICS, HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 132–35 (2008),
https://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/documents/2008_House_Ethics_M
anual.pdf [https://perma.cc/82ZD-LX75] [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL] (providing
that, generally, solicitation of funds from governmental offices is prohibited).
90
See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1670 (finding that Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) does not
burden judicial candidates’ speech rights).
91
See id. at 1679 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Florida’s Canon 7(C)(1) applies to
anybody, not just those who could appear in the court).
92
See id. (explaining that the prohibition of monetary solicitations by a judge applies to
everyone). See also id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting) (advising that the prohibition on judicial
candidates applies even if there is no chance the person will ever have any stake in a case in
the court).
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potential for corruption and the appearance of impropriety are palpably
higher in the judicial context than in the non-judicial context.93
The Court’s critical—yet implicit—distinction between judicial and
non-judicial elections presents in at least two critical ways. First, when it
comes to a compelling governmental interest, comparing Citizens United
and Williams-Yulee suggests that for non-judicial candidates the main
concern pivots on the potential for a quid pro quo while for judicial elections
the Court appears to worry about the appearance of impropriety and the
public perception of judicial integrity. 94 Second, a similar distinction
emerges in the Court’s application of the narrowly-tailored requirement.
The Court has consistently permitted non-judicial candidates to directly
solicit funds, though not from a candidate’s official governmental office.95
In Williams-Yulee and the judicial electoral context, by contrast, the Court
permitted Florida’s total ban of direct fundraising solicitations by judicial
candidates.
More fundamentally, however, the Court felt compelled to
characterize judicial and non-judicial candidates for elected public office
differently and in ways that triggered different judicial scrutiny over
campaign finance issues.96 In an effort to climb out from under its earlier
decision in Citizens United, the majority in Williams-Yulee took great pains
to argue that judicial and non-judicial candidates are expected to act and
campaign differently.97 The Court’s decisions simply assert that states
have a broader interest in preserving the appearance of judicial integrity
than in preserving a similar appearance for those seeking legislative and
executive offices.98
III. PRIOR EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP
This study builds on and extends prior scholarship by Professors
Kang and Shepherd which used an earlier (1995–98) state supreme court
See Case Comment, Williams-Yulee and the Anomaly of Campaign Finance Law, 126 YALE
L.J. 1577, 1585 (2017) (“[s]tates have a broader interest in preserving the appearance of
judicial integrity than in preventing the appearance of legislative and executive corruption”).
94
Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010) (explaining
that the goal of contribution limits is preventing quid pro quo corruption), with Williams-Yulee,
135 S. Ct. at 1673 (stating that there is a compelling interest in preserving judicial integrity).
95
See, e.g., HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 89, at 132 (discussing the inability of
politicians to solicit funds from governmental offices).
96
See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[s]ince judges should be
accorded special respect and dignity, their election can be subject to certain content-based
rules that would be unacceptable in other elections”).
97
See id. at 1667 (discussing how the state’s interest is different in judicial campaigns as
opposed to legislative and executive campaigns).
98
See id. (stating that because the roles of judges and politicians differ, legal rules
regulating their respective campaigns should also differ).
93
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data set.99 Their earlier work found strong relations between the
probability of an elected state supreme court justice’s pro-business vote
and the amount (and proportion) of campaign contributions that these
justices received from pro-business interests.100
Kang and Shepherd’s findings in the business litigation context
generally comport with analogous empirical work focusing on other
litigation sectors. Professor Shepherd has also found that interest group
judicial campaign contributions increase “the probability that judges will
vote for the litigants favored by those interest groups.” 101 In addition, an
array of smaller-scale studies of individual states note relations between
lawyers’ campaign contributions and case outcomes when those lawyers
(or the lawyers’ interests) appear in court.102
Professor Shepherd’s more recent empirical work focusing on the
potential influence wielded by pro-business interests through judicial
campaign contributions to state supreme court justices reinforces
important—and uncomfortable—questions.103
Examining businessrelated cases decided by state supreme courts from 2010–12, Professor
Shepherd’s 2013 report, “Justice At Risk,” similar to her prior work, finds
“a significant relationship between business group contributions to state
supreme court justices and the voting of those justices in cases involving
business matters.”104 Fueled by her empirical findings, Shepherd’s
normative perspective on the issue is clear when she characterizes
campaign contributions’ role in judicial elections as “destructive.” 105
99
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 72 (analyzing new data that builds on data
collected from 1995–1998).
100
See id. at 73 (finding that as judicial campaign contributions from big businesses
increased, so too did the likelihood that judges will find for business litigants).
101
Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 669–72 &
tbls. 7 & 8 (2009).
102
See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration
Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 661 (1999) (noting the influence of plaintiff and defense
lawyers’ contributions and favorable arbitration rulings by the Alabama Supreme Court);
Eric N. Waltenburg & Charles S. Lopeman, Tort Decisions and Campaign Dollars, 28 SE. POL.
REV. 241, 24 (2000) (explaining the influence of plaintiff and defense lawyers’ contributions
and favorable torts cases in Ohio, Alabama, and Kentucky); Madhavi McCall, The Politics of
Judicial Elections: The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the Voting Patterns of Texas
Supreme Court Justices, 1994-1997, 31 POL. & POL’Y 314, 315, 330 (2003) (finding that businessrelated judicial campaign contributions influenced case outcomes in the Texas Supreme
Court).
103
See JOANNA SHEPHERD, JUSTICE AT RISK: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 1 (AM. CONST. SOC’Y. FOR L. & POL’Y, June 2013),
https://www.acslaw.org/ACS%20Justice%20at%20Risk%20(FINAL)%206_10_13.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZX72-V5CT] (confirming a strong relationship between campaign
contributions from businesses and state supreme court justice voting).
104
Id.
105
Id. at 2.
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While Shepherd’s recent brief report represents another important
contribution to the literature, her analyses also open an array of additional
research questions. This Article examines one of the research questions
prompted by Shepherd’s report.
Shepherd’s 2013 report contributes to, and builds on, a nascent—
through growing—empirical literature that endeavors to assess and
model judicial outcomes.106 As I discuss more fully below, core findings
from Shepherd’s 2013 study stood up well to replication efforts as well as
most of her alternative model specifications. Setting aside one’s priors
about how to best reconcile constitutionally-protected core political
speech, judicial campaign contributions, and the various selection
mechanisms states employ for judges and justices, Shepherd’s (and that of
others) broad critique advanced against business interests’ participation
in judicial elections—even if empirically accurate—may either go too far
or, paradoxically, not far enough. And only after deeper empirical
exploration do the more abstract principles fall out of comparatively easy
focus and nettlesome granularity and complicating wrinkles emerge.
Moreover, despite its contributions, a few factors, notably the
potential for measurement error, limit the strength of Shepherd’s 2013
findings. The data set (described more fully below) includes state
supreme court decisions reached between 2010–12 and in states where
state supreme court justices were elected in some manner (i.e., retention,
partisan, or non-partisan elections).107 The data set leverages the justices’
political party affiliation as a proxy (albeit imperfect) for judicial ideology.
As Professor Kritzer observes, however, those state supreme court justices
that confronted partisan elections before 2010 include those from southern
states where “at least some of these justices were business-oriented
Democrats.”108 As such, the specter of measurement error lurks.
Any data set limitations notwithstanding, because my study extends
Shepherd’s 2013 report and data set, it is particularly important to note
how my study differs. From the perspective of research design,
Shepherd’s focus on business cases (specifically business cases that
reached state supreme courts between 2010 and 2012 which involved a
business and a non-business litigant) makes good and obvious sense.
After all, efforts to distill judicial outcomes require careful strategies to
“keep all else constant,” or at least as much as possible. Despite important
variation within “business litigation,” a focus on business litigation helps
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 102 (providing various legal scholarship regarding
state judicial elections).
107
See infra Part IV (describing the data and variables used to extend prior work on judicial
campaign funding).
108
Kritzer, supra note 5, at 366.
106
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rein in the sometimes tremendously complicating variation that exists
across various cases, types, and litigating parties. Filtering the data set
further to include only cases involving a business and a non-business
litigant facilitates efforts to distill each individual justice’s vote as either
pro- or anti-business. The distillation of judicial votes to either a probusiness or anti-business characterization is particularly helpful for
broader generalizations of the tort reform context that are frequently
dominated by pro-business (or Chamber of Commerce) and anti-business
(frequently union) interests.
Indeed, Shepherd’s careful attention to research design only enhances
a reader’s confidence in her results. Building on their observation that
“[a]lthough any interest group might exert influence over the judiciary,
business groups may be unique in their ability to do so,”109 Professors
Kang and Shepherd’s existing work focuses on pro-business
contributions’ potential influence. According to Kang and Shepherd,
business contributors’ “substantial resources,” more focused political and
legal agenda, and greater “stake” in the outcome of judicial elections is
what distinguishes them from non-business contributors.110
While Shepherd’s data set is certainly well-suited to (and, indeed,
designed for) her focus on pro-business interests’ potential influence on
judicial outcomes through campaign contributions, the data set also
permits—even invites—further related exploration in two important
ways. First, the data set includes information on each justice’s campaign
contributions from business interests as well as the total amount of each
justice’s campaign contributions. As such, simple data manipulations
generated information on each justice’s non-business campaign
contributions. While each justice’s non-business campaign contributions
certainly warrant exploration, the nature of the non-business campaign
contributions precludes strong generalizations.
The interpretative
limitations and ambiguity flow from the composition of the non-business
contributions. Sources of non-business judicial campaign contributions
range from a judicial candidate’s own personal contributions to those
from, for example, labor unions. While limiting my characterization of
this sub-pool of campaign contributions as merely non-business may
reflect over-caution, the varied and wide-ranging sources of funds that

Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 85.
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 17, at 85 (explaining that business groups may be
unique in their ability to exert power over the judiciary due to their substantial resources
and the great deal they have at stake in their support of judicial candidates).
109
110
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compose
non-business
contributions
preclude
a
stronger
characterization.111
Second, while the non-business sub-pool of campaign contributions
may be inherently ambiguous, the data set also identifies and codes those
non-business contributions from labor unions and democratic political
party committees.112 Contributions from these two sources are far less
ambiguous and are more plausibly characterized as anti-business. After
all, labor unions enjoy a robust history opposing management and
Shepherd’s paper exploits a judge’s political party as an ideological
control variable signaling a judge’s posture to business interests. 113
Separate analyses focusing on the sub-pool of anti-business campaign
contributions not only permits a stronger characterization of the nature of
such contributions, but they also serve as a robustness check on the more
general non-business findings.
In addition to expanding Shepherd’s work by exploring alternative
dependent variables, my models depart in a few (albeit minor) technical
ways from Shepherd’s models. First, while Shepherd’s main model
construes business contributions in terms of their raw total as well as in
terms of a percentage of total judicial campaign contributions, my
analyses focus only on business (and non-business and anti-business)
contributions as a percentage of total campaign contributions. Second,
because the political science and empirical legal literatures on judicial
decision-making typically include a measure of how much time remains
on a judge’s (or a governor’s) elected term when a decision was reached,
my models include a dummy variable signaling whenever a justice voted
on a case with two or fewer years remaining on her elected term to the
bench.
Third, Shepherd’s models include dummy variables identifying
democrat and republican justices. The reference group in Shepherd’s
report, for interpretative purposes, involves those justices whose political
affiliation was either missing or coded for something other than democrat
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 22 n.64 (noting that the non-business contributions
include those from “interests often opposed to business,” and that Shepherd felt that
reflexively construing all non-business contributions as anti-business, invited measurement
error).
112
See id. at 1 (presenting general information on the manner data was gathered that
included gathering data on all contributions made, which would include labor union
contributions and contributions from democratic political party committees).
113
See, e.g., Melvyn Dubofsky, AMERICAN LABOR SINCE THE NEW DEAL 59–60, 62 (Melvyn
Dubofsky, 1971) (showing one perspective on labor unions’ uneasy relation with
management over time). See also Thomas B. Edsall, Republicans Sure Love to Hate Unions, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/opinion/republicans-surelove-to-hate-unions.html?mcubz=0 [http://perma.cc/U2HV-GT65] (providing an essay
exploring labor unions’ traditional political support for democrats).
111
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or republican. As I describe in greater detail below, my models include
only one dummy variable identifying either democrat or republican
justices.114 (Alternative specifications include dummy variables for
“democrat” and “republican,” respectively.) In this way, my model
specifications consciously “stack-the-deck” against the potential salience
of a justice’s political affiliation. Thus, where a justice’s political affiliation
achieves statistical significance, my coding decisions should increase
readers’ confidence in the finding. As I describe below, however, my
coding decisions also contributed to some political salience results that
depart slightly from Shepherd’s earlier results.
IV. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND RESEARCH DESIGN
To test the possible influence of campaign contributions from pro-,
non-, and anti-business sources on state supreme court justices’ votes in
cases where one of the litigating parties is a business interest, I use a data
set constructed by Professor Shepherd that itself is the product of four
discrete data sets, each briefly described below. 115 First, a team of
independent researchers from Emory University School of Law collected
and coded state supreme court decisions (N=30,355) between 2010 and
2012 and across all fifty states.116 A sub-set of this data set, 21,105 entries
(69.5%), involved cases where the identified business interest was on
one—and only one—side of the litigation. This filtering was necessary for
research design purposes as outcomes in these cases facilitate an
assessment of the degree to which, if any, business campaign
contributions may have informed justices’ votes in business-related cases.
For each case, the researchers coded whether each participating justice,
sitting as a member of a multi-judge appellate panel, cast either a pro- or
anti-business vote in a case.
A second data set includes information on the more than 175,000
contribution records that detail every reported contribution to every
sitting state supreme court justice between 2010–12 in each elected state
supreme court justice’s most recent election. These data were collected by
the National Institute on Money in State Politics (“Institute”), a nonpartisan, nonprofit charitable organization that focuses on data gathering
on campaign finance activity in all fifty states. The Institute obtains the
campaign finance data in either electronic or paper form from state
disclosure agencies. The Institute assigned each donor an economic
See infra Part IV.
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 10 (outlining the four discrete data sets that were
compiled by Professor Shepherd).
116
See id. at 1 (describing the independent team’s data gathering of court decisions from
all fifty states between 2010 and 2012).
114
115
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interest code determined by information included in the disclosure
reports as well as deeper independent research into the donor’s economic
background and interests. From the Institute data, campaign contribution
data for all judges in the sample data who were candidates in both
partisan and nonpartisan state supreme court races were computed.
A third data set includes political party affiliations (if any) for each of
the 439 state supreme court justices and a fourth contains state-specific
information on how each state selects and retains its supreme court
justices. Once merged, the final data set includes justice-level information
on 439 state supreme court justices who participated in 2,345 concluded
business-related cases, every justice’s vote in each case, along with an
array of contextual and background information (on the justice, campaign
contributions, case, court, and state) that might help explain a justice’s
vote.
A. Description of Key Variables
The following key variables explore the relation between justices’
votes favoring a business litigant and judicial campaign contributions
from business and non-business interests. To better isolate the
independent influence of campaign contributions, the models include an
array of standard control variables.
1.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable is a dummy variable signaling when a justice
voted in favor of the business litigant. A judicial vote is coded as probusiness if the end result favored or advantaged the business litigant,
regardless of whether the actual judge vote took the form of a reversal,
affirmance, or damage award alteration. In model specifications that
explore the influence of non- and anti-business campaign contributions,
the dependent variable signals when a justice voted in favor on the nonbusiness litigant.117
2.

Key Independent Variables of Interest

The key independent variables of interest include judicial campaign
contributions from pro-, non-, and anti-business interests. While an exact
measure of a pro-business interest eludes, I followed Shepherd’s coding
convention and defined pro-business interests’ campaign contributions to
include those from agriculture, communications, construction, defense,
See id. at 12 (presenting an explanation for what the dependent variable in the analysis
examining the biasing effects of judicial campaign contributions on judicial decisions).

117
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energy, finance and real estate, and general business sources.118 Nonbusiness contributions were computed to include all financial
contributions that came from sources other than those identified as a probusiness source.119 Finally, anti-business contributions, a sub-pool of the
non-business contributions, include only those contributions from either
labor unions or democratic party political committees.120
Insofar as the raw total amount of judicial campaign contributions
from pro-, non-, and anti-business sources varied across judges, along
with variation in a justice’s total campaign contributions, all pro-, non-,
and anti-business judicial campaign contributions are expressed as a
percentage of each justice’s total campaign contributions. As Professor
Shepherd notes, “[t]his is likely a more accurate measure of business
influence [on a particular justice] because the impact of a contribution
likely depends on its importance relative to other contributions.” 121
While the pro-, non-, and anti-business contributions are expressed as
a percentage of each justice’s total amount of campaign contributions, to
get a better sense as to their relative contribution, the magnitude of a
justice’s campaign contributions also warrants attention. Accordingly, all
of the model specifications include a variable reflecting the raw total of
each justice’s campaign contributions. Finally, all judicial campaign
contributions are expressed as natural logs.
3.

Control Variables

All model specifications include various control variables at the case,
justice, and state levels. In addition, because the outcome of individual
cases within a state or by the same justice might not include the necessary
independence from one another, case outcomes are clustered at the stateand individual-justice levels.
118
See id. at 10 (explaining that for robustness purposes, and to tether this work with prior,
related work, alternative supplemental specifications considered a narrower definition of
“pro-business interests” that included only business-related contributions from finance and
real estate, “general” business, and health industry sources). See, e.g., Kang & Shepherd,
supra note 48, at 1271 (showing that prior literature defines a narrower definition of business
interests as those aligning with “conservative” interests and agenda). Id. at 1270 n.129
(discussing that unpublished results from these alternative specifications are generally
consistent with a broader definition of pro-business contributions).
119
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 12 (noting that non-business contributions equaled
total contributions minus pro-business contributions).
120
See infra note 121 and accompanying text (describing the composition of anti-business
contributions).
121
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 10–12. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, I re-ran in
supplemental analyses (unreported) models whose results are presented in tbls.1–3. See also
infra Tables 1–3 (substituting raw totals for percentages as a measure of business
contributions to judicial campaigns did not materially affect the substantive results).
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While cases in this study are limited to business litigation (signaled by
the presence of a business litigant), important variation can exist within
business cases. A case’s underlying legal merits, to some degree, inform
a justice’s vote and the legal strength of business cases can vary. In this
context, it is possible that some of the business cases heard by state
supreme courts were either so strong or weak on the legal merits that
justices voted for (or against) the business interest independent of any
campaign contributions received from pro-, non-, or anti-business
interests or the justices’ ideological preferences (signaled by a judge’s
political party affiliation or, if none existed, by imputing to a judge an
appointing governor’s political party).122
How to measure a case’s underlying legal strength, however, remains
contested. By definition, every case in this study persisted through a trial
and, in most states, some level of intermediate appellate review before it
reached a state supreme court for resolution. Presumably, and consistent
with case selection theory, cases whose underlying legal merits that
strongly tilt in either direction (either pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant)
would likely have succumbed to settlement pressures rather than
persisting through state supreme court review. While Priest-Klein theory
implies that only cases where some degree of objective uncertainty exists
about a case’s outcome would persist to a state supreme court for
disposition (and, if so, this would result in win rates that approximate fifty
percent), empirical work makes clear how important variation exists in
terms of observed win rates across case types. 123 What is equally clear,
however, is that some of the assumptions underneath the Priest-Klein
prediction, including asymmetric information, similar stakes invested by
both parties to a lawsuit, and accurate ex ante assessments about a case’s
underlying legal merits, do not hold with the precision that theory might
imply.124
In an effort to control the underlying legal strength of the cases
(however imperfectly), I incorporate the clever case strength variable
crafted by Professor Shepherd. In constructing a measure of case strength,
Professor Shepherd initially estimated a model without a case strength
variable to assess the most likely number of pro-business votes for the
122
See id. at 14 (noting that despite business contributions, judges can also vote owing to
their political beliefs). See also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public
and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 743, 745 (2005)
(discussing the robustness of political party as a proxy for a judge’s ideological preferences).
123
See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes For Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984). See also Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, & Daniel Klerman, The Priest-Klein Hypothesis:
Proofs and Generality, 48 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 59, 65 (2016) (highlighting the Priest-Klein’s
hypothesis of case variations and outcomes).
124
See Lee & Klerman, supra note 123, at 70.
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state justices hearing the case. The estimated number of pro-business
votes exploits information on each justice’s political party affiliation.
Backing-out the actual number of pro-business judicial votes observed in
a case from the number of estimated pro-business judicial votes provides
a sense of the underlying strength of the case’s legal merits.
To illustrate, consider a model estimation predicting that five of the
seven state justices would vote in favor of the business interest. If in the
actual case six of the seven justices voted in favor of the business interest,
the value of the case strength variable in this case would be positive
suggesting that the underlying legal strength of the case is stronger than
predicted. If, in contrast, only two of the seven justices voted in favor of
the business interest, the case strength variable would be negative,
indicating a comparatively weaker case on the legal merits. By computing
the difference (if any) between the predicted (modeled) number of probusiness votes and the observed number of pro-business votes in each
case generates a case strength variable, which provides some insight into
a case’s underlying legal strength that will influence judicial outcomes
intendent of judicial campaign contributions from business interests. The
inclusion of the case strength variable as a control is designed to help
isolate the potential unique influence of campaign contributions from
pro-, non-, and anti-business interests on justices’ decisions in business
cases.
To further address possible selection effect influences, a final caselevel control variable signals when the petitioner was the business litigant
(in the pro-business model) and the non-business litigant (for the non- and
anti-business models).
At the individual justice-level, Professor
Shepherd’s 2013 analysis includes dummy variables for both republican
and democratic justices as a (imperfect) proxy for judicial ideology. 125
Consequently, for interpretative purposes, the appropriate reference for
each political party dummy variable is the comparatively smallest group
of justices (almost twelve percent) who are either a member of a political
party other than republican or democrat or, in contrast, are those for
whom information on their political affiliation is missing.
My analyses, by contrast, reflect a slightly different coding decision
on how best to treat judges whose political affiliation is either unknown,
missing, or something other than republican or democrat. By including in
my models only one dummy variable for a justice’s political affiliation
(republican or democrat), my model facilitates a more intuitive reference
point (e.g., republican justices as compared to all other justices who are not
republican). Moreover, such a coding strategy is also structurally more
125
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 12 (describing Shepherd’s use of political party
affiliation to signal judicial ideology).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss1/3

Heise: The Complicated Business of State Supreme Court Elections: An Emp

2017]

“Buying” Justice

45

conservative insofar as it treats all unknowns as something other than
what the coefficient captures.126 Insofar as my coding convention is
structured to mute the attribute I assess, where a justice’s political
affiliation variable achieves statistical significance, confidence about its
actual influence should increase.
Finally, Shepherd’s models omit any information on how much time
remains in a justice’s elected term when she voted in a case.127 Political
science literature on judicial outcomes emphasizes how judicial conduct
may be influenced as justices approach electoral events, particularly in the
criminal law domain.128 As a result, my model includes a dummy variable
that signals when a judge voted in a case within two years of the end of a
judicial term.
The models also include an array of state-level controls, beginning
with variables signaling whether a state’s method of judicial elections
were partisan or non-partisan contests.129 As well, in states where the
existing legal climate is business-friendly, one might reasonably expect
more judicial votes favoring business interests regardless of a judge’s
business-related judicial campaign contributions. To better isolate the
potential influence of campaign contributions from a state’s overall
business legal climate, the models include a tort liability index,
constructed by the Pacific Research Institute.130 Finally, as judicial votes
in business-related cases may also reflect public preferences or ideological
trends, the models include a traditional and well-known measure of a
state’s ideological preference.131

Cf. Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets.
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 17–20 (noting that Shepherd’s models do not take into
account how much time is left on a judge’s elected term).
128
See, e.g., Kenneth Bresler, Seeking Justice, Seeking Election, and Seeking the Death Penalty:
The Ethics of Prosecutorial Candidates’ Campaigning on Capital Convictions, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 941, 941–43 (1994) (detailing pressures generated by prosecutors’ electioneering). See
also Ronald J. Tabak, Commentary, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and
Due Process Survive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 280, 280–81 (1994)
(describing the perceived political pressures associated with death penalty decisions);
Michael Heise, The Death of Death Row Clemency and the Evolving Politics of Unequal Grace, 66
ALA. L. REV. 949, 980–81 (2015) (assessing the influence of reelection cycles on clemency
grants for death row inmates).
129
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 11.
130
See Lawrence J. McQuillan & Hovannes Abramyan, U.S. Tort Liability Index, 2010 Report,
PAC. RES. INST., http://www.civiljusticenj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/2010_Tort_
Liability_Index.pdf [https://perma.cc/V225-8FLD] (noting that the index uses data
available as of Oct. 1, 2009).
131
See William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in American States,
1960-93, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327, 327 (1998) (showing that the index uses updated data through
2008).
126
127
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B. Methodology and Research Design
The cases in this study are limited in two important ways. First, the
data include civil litigation where a business interest was on one, and only
one, side of the litigation. 132 Limiting the data set in this way facilitates
characterizing each justice’s vote as either pro-business or not probusiness. Second, the analyses include only those states where state
supreme court justices are elected in some manner (i.e., retention, partisan,
or non-partisan elections). While not all state supreme court justices
confront some form of election, as Figure 1 (below) makes clear, judicial
campaign contributions do not exist where judicial elections do not exist.
While collapsing the three major forms of judicial elections might invite
criticism, Figure 1 illustrates that even judicial retention elections attract
some level of campaign contributions (though far less than non-partisan
and partisan judicial elections). Potential criticism aside, including all
forms of judicial elections is necessary to tether this study to prior
empirical work in this field.133
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Empirical results—both descriptive and more granular regression
models—help explain various influences on state supreme court justices’
votes in business cases.134
A. Descriptive Results
How states structure judicial elections influences business
contributions to judicial campaigns. 135 Figure 1 illustrates how business
contributions to judicial campaigns distribute across the four major
judicial selection mechanisms. As one would expect, in states where
supreme court justices are appointed rather than elected, justices received
no business-related contributions. Where elections select state supreme
court justices, by contrast, business interests participate in those
campaigns partly through financial contributions. The percentage of
business-related contributions varies among the three major judicial
election forms—retention, nonpartisan, and partisan. Again, consistent
with common sense, Figure 1 illustrates that the percentage of businessSee SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 11 (describing Shepherd’s research design).
See id. at 4 (establishing that the study looked at several types of election processes,
which allowed for a more complete and extensive study).
134
See id. at 12 (explaining that granular regression models are useful in studies of
influence on judges).
135
See id. at 13 (discussing how state constructions of judicial retention can influence how
judges receive business contribution).
132
133
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related judicial campaign contributions were at their highest in partisan
judicial elections and lowest in retention elections.
Figure 1: Distribution of Pro-Business Contributions (%) Across
Various Methods of State Supreme Court Justice Selection
Retention Election

Nonpartisan Election

Partisan Election

0

50

100

0

50

100

No Election

0

50

100

0

50

100

Percent of Contributions from Business

SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets.
One important way this Article expands on Shepherd’s 2013 analysis
is by including judicial campaign contributions from non-business
interests. Consequently, it is important to view business and non-business
contributions in relation to one another. Figure 2 presents kernel density
estimates of the distributions of (logged) business and non-business
campaign contributions as a percentage of total campaign contributions
and the line patterns inform. Specifically, the overall visual impression is
one of an “X,” with the business and non-business lines intersecting just
past the fifty percent point. That is, the business and non-business lines
essentially reflect one another. Of course, given the somewhat reciprocal
nature of the coding protocols for the business and non-business
contribution variables, the visual pattern emerging in Figure 2 does not
surprise. While Figure 2 does reveal some degree of overlap (that is, some
justices received campaign contributions from both business and nonbusiness sources), the overall impression is one of separation. That is,
most judicial candidates received the bulk of their campaign contributions
from either business or non-business interests.
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimates, pro-business and non-business
contributions
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SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets.
B. Regression Results
While the descriptive results comport with intuitive notions about the
relation between judicial selection methods and business campaign
contributions in judicial elections, as well as between business and nonbusiness judicial campaign contribution trends, more nuanced regression
analyses are necessary to isolate and identify possible relations between
business (and non-business) contributions and judicial votes in business
cases.
1.

Pro-Business Judicial Campaign Contributions

Table 1 presents results from the mixed effects models on business
campaign contributions’ influence on judge votes in business cases. As it
relates to the key variable of interest—campaign contributions from
business interests (expressed as a percentage of a justice’s total campaign
receipts)—results in Table 1 make clear that as the percentage of a justice’s
campaign contributions from pro-business interests increased, so too did
the likelihood of the justice voting in a manner that favors the business
litigant. Interestingly, at the same time, an increase in total campaign
contributions corresponds with a reduction in the likelihood of a justice
casting a pro-business vote. Among the various types of judicial election
mechanisms, partisan elections were more likely to generate justices who
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cast pro-business votes. Justices’ ideology (expressed through political
party affiliation) also achieves statistical significance and it does so in the
expected directions. That is, while republican justices were more
favorable to business litigants, democratic justices were systematically less
favorable (Table 1, columns A and B, respectively). A state’s tort climate,
another important control variable, also achieves statistical significance in
the expected direction; an increase in a state’s liability index corresponds
with a decreased likelihood of a pro-business judicial outcome. Finally,
case strength also proved important. As a business case’s underlying legal
strength increased, so too did the likelihood of a justice vote in favor of the
business interest.
Notably, when the business interest was the petitioner, the likelihood
of a pro-business outcome decreased. Interestingly, a similar finding
emerges in both non-business models as well. That the petitioner status
variable’s association with decreasing the probability of a favorable judge
vote cuts across the business/non-business divide implies that what it
signals may have little to do with the business (or non-business) context.
While these data and models do not address this particular question, it
remains possible that these findings reflect a “pro-affirmance” bias at the
state supreme court level. Setting aside selection effects’ important
influences on appellate reversal rates as well as variations across case
types, prior work on various civil appellate contexts (including state and
federal) implies an overall impression of the comparative difficulty that
petitioners confront when seeking to overturn a lower court decision. 136
Thus, the finding in Table 1 suggesting that business petitioners reduce
the probability of a judge voting in favor of the business litigant needs to
be understood within an appellate context that, on balance, displays a
general tilt toward respondents independent of the business litigation
context.

136
See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts Redux? An
Empirical Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 100, 110 (2015),
tbl.1 (summarizing state and federal civil appeals reversal rates).
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TABLE 1: MIXED EFFECTS MODEL OF PRO-BUSINESS JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS’ INFLUENCE ON JUDICIAL VOTING IN
BUSINESS CASES (2010-2012)
(A)
Judge vote favoring business litigant:

(B)
(s.e.)

(s.e.)

Pro-Business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.)
Total campaign contrib. ($10K)

0.210 **
-0.111 *

(0.07)
(0.05)

0.211 **
-0.124 **

(0.07)
(0.05)

Non-partisan judicial election
Partisan election
Justice w/in 2 years of term end
Republican justice
Democrat justice

-0.150
0.775 *
-0.044
0.712 **
---

(0.35)
(0.38)
(0.15)
(0.19)
---

-0.249
0.915 *
-0.019
---0.846 **

(0.34)
(0.38)
(0.15)
--(0.20)

State tort climate
State citizen ideology
State elite ideology

-0.761 **
-0.002
-0.010

(0.23)
(0.01)
(0.01)

-0.835 **
-0.006
-0.012

(0.23)
(0.01)
(0.01)

Business litigant was petitioner
Case strength

-0.463 **
0.072 **

(0.10)
(0.00)

-0.461 **
0.072 **

(0.10)
(0.00)

Constant
(N)

0.317
7,112

(0.58)

0.562
7,112

(0.57)

NOTES: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These
models include all pro-business campaign contributions (logged) as a
percentage of a justice’s total amount of campaign contributions (logged).
All model specifications include state- and justice-level clusters. Mixed
effects models estimated using the “meqrlogit” command in Stata (v.14.1).
Model A includes the republican justice dummy variable; model B
includes the democrat justice dummy variable.
SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets.
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Although my model specifications depart slightly from Shepherd’s,137
results in Table 1 largely track Shepherd’s main findings presented in her
2013 report.138 Shepherd’s analyses focus on the influence of pro-business
campaign contributions and, having successfully largely replicated
Shepherd’s core results, this paper extends Shepherd’s by turning to the
possible influence of non- and anti-business campaign contributions on
justices’ votes that favored non-business litigants.
2.

Non-Business Judicial Campaign Contributions

Table 2 reports results after essentially “flipping” Shepherd’s basic
model. That is, where Table 1 reports results from models assessing the
relation between pro-business judicial campaign contributions and the
probability that a justice voted in favor of the business litigant, Table 2, by
contrast, assesses the possible influence of non-business judicial campaign
contributions on the likelihood that a justice voted in favor of the nonbusiness litigant.
While a robust inference from Table 1 might induce an expectation for
reciprocal findings in Table 2, results in Table 2 provide only partial
support for such expectations. Specifically, as it relates to the particular
variable of interest, Table 2 illustrates that non-business judicial campaign
contributions correlate with an increased likelihood of a judicial judge
votes is present for both pro- and non-business settings, the influence is
comparatively stronger for the pro-business setting.
While analyses of pro- and non-business judicial campaign
contributions’ efficacy in terms of influencing favorable judicial outcomes
uncovers a few subtle differences, the overall weight of the results conveys
a stronger sense of convergence. For example, the relation between nonbusiness contributions and judge votes is just as pronounced for
democratic and republican judges, though in the expected opposite
directions. Moreover, the case strength variable achieves statistical
significance (and in the expected direction). 139 Finally, the influence of a
non-business interest petitioner significantly decreases the likelihood of a
non-business vote. As discussed previously, a similar finding emerges in
the pro-business context and both may have more to do with a general
“pro-affirmance” tilt in civil appellate litigation than with judicial
campaign contributions.

See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 17.
See id. (explaining Shepherd’s main findings).
139
See infra Tables 2 & 3 (describing the underlying legal strength of a pro-business case
became “stronger,” it reduced the probability of a judge vote favoring the non- [tbl.2] and
anti-business [tbl.3] interest).
137
138
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TABLE 2: MIXED EFFECTS MODEL OF NON-BUSINESS JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS’ INFLUENCE ON JUDICIAL VOTING IN BUSINESS CASES
(2010-2012)
(A)
Judge vote favoring non-business litigant:

(B)
(s.e.)

(s.e.)

Non-Business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.)
Total campaign contrib. ($10K)

0.088 *
-0.078

(0.04)
(0.04)

0.090 *
-0.067

(0.04)
(0.04)

Non-partisan judicial election
Partisan election
Justice w/in 2 years of term end
Republican justice
Democrat justice

-0.144
-0.834 *
0.080
-0.793 **
---

(0.36)
(0.38)
(0.15)
(0.19)
---

-0.038
-0.986 **
0.054
--0.922 **

(0.35)
(0.38)
(0.15)
--(0.20)

State tort climate
State citizen ideology
State elite ideology

0.641 **
0.006
0.011

(0.24)
(0.01)
(0.01)

0.721 **
-0.003
0.012

(0.23)
(0.01)
(0.01)

Non-business litigant was petitioner
Case strength

-0.468 **
-0.072 **

(0.10)
(0.00)

-0.466 **
-0.072 **

(0.10)
(0.00)

Constant
(N)

-0.103
7,112

(0.59)

-0.391
7,112

(0.57)

NOTES: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These
models include all non-business campaign contributions (logged) as a
percentage of a justice’s total amount of campaign contributions (logged).
All model specifications include state- and justice-level clusters. Mixed
effects models estimated using the “meqrlogit” command in Stata (v.14.1).
Non-business judicial campaign contributions include all contributions
other than pro-business contributions. Model A includes the republican
justice dummy variable; model B includes the democrat justice dummy
variable.
SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets.
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Anti-Business Judicial Campaign Contributions

While judicial campaign contributions’ varied sources permit the
identification of sources plausibly construed as “pro-business,” the
construction of the non-business contributions do not, as Shepherd briefly
notes, easily support a characterization of them as “anti-business.”140
Rather, for interpretative purposes, results in Table 2 can only be
understood (at least conservatively and cautiously) as “non-business.” A
deeper understanding of whether judicial campaign contributions
plausibly characterized as “anti-business” is possible only after
constructing a new variable, which includes a sub-pool of non-business
contributions limited to contributions from labor unions and democratic
party campaign committees. This alternative specification also provides
something of a robustness check on the stability of the prior findings.
As Table 3 illustrates, the main findings that emerge in Table 2 remain
intact. All of the variables that achieve statistical significance in the nonbusiness model retain their significance in the anti-business model.
Importantly, the presence of judicial campaign contributions from antibusiness sources systematically correlate with an increased probability of
a judge voting in favor of the non-business litigant. And this finding
emerges after controlling for the underlying legal strength of the case (as
well as the independent influence of other control variables). Similar to
earlier findings, the influence of judicial campaign contributions on
judicial outcomes achieves statistical significance only in the partisan
election context. Another factor that links Tables 1, 2, and 3 is the
consistent salience of a party’s status as a petitioner. Again, as previously
discussed, it remains a distinct possibility that this variable is picking up
a possible “affirmance bias” present in state supreme courts. Finally, if
nothing else, that Table 3’s results essentially track those in Table 2
conveys the overall findings’ stickiness and robustness to alternative
model specifications.

Cf. SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 16 (construing judicial campaign contributions as either
“pro-business” or “anti-business”).

140
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TABLE 3: MIXED EFFECTS MODEL OF ANTI-BUSINESS JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS’ INFLUENCE ON JUDICIAL VOTING
IN BUSINESS CASES (2010-2012)
Judge vote favoring non-business litigant:

(A)

(s.e.)

(B)

(s.e.)

Anti-Business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.)
Total campaign contrib. ($10K)

0.129 *
-0.024

(0.06)
(0.03)

0.142 *
-0.014

(0.06)
(0.03)

Non-partisan judicial election
Partisan election
Justice w/in 2 years of term end
Republican justice
Democrat justice

0.006
-0.925 *
0.074
-0.729 **
---

(0.35)
(0.39)
(0.15)
(0.20)
---

0.105
-1.080 **
0.048
--0.878 **

(0.34)
(0.39)
(0.15)
--(0.20)

State tort climate
State citizen ideology
State elite ideology

0.775 **
0.004
0.005

(0.23)
(0.01)
(0.01)

0.854 **
-0.005
0.006

(0.23)
(0.01)
(0.01)

Non-business litigant was petitioner
Case strength

-0.470 **
-0.072 **

(0.10)
(0.00)

-0.470 **
-0.072 **

(0.10)
(0.00)

Constant
(N)

0.472
7,112

(0.65)

0.288
7,112

(0.63)

NOTES: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. These
models include anti-business campaign contributions (logged) as a
percentage of a justice’s total amount of campaign contributions (logged).
All model specifications include state- and justice-level clusters. Mixed
effects models estimated using the “meqrlogit” command in Stata (v.14.1).
Anti-business judicial campaign contributions include funds from either
labor unions or democratic party committees (or both). Model A includes
the republican justice dummy variable; model B includes the democrat
justice dummy variable.
SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets.
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C. Discussion
Results from Table 1, independently and in conjunction with prior
empirical work, provide support for those worried about the potentially
distorting influence of judicial campaign contributions from pro-business
interests on judicial outcomes.141 Indeed, similar findings from her own
related analyses prompted Professor Shepherd to characterize probusiness judicial campaign contributions’ role as “destructive.” 142 And
Shepherd’s normative conclusions are echoed by others.143
Equally important as the findings on the influence of pro-business
judicial campaign contributions (Table 1) are findings of similar influences
achieved by non- and anti-business contributions (Tables 2 and 3,
respectively). Expanding and building upon Shepherd’s earlier work
reveals that Shepherd’s analyses (and conclusions) speak to only one piece
of a more complex judicial campaign contribution puzzle. The pieces
provided by my additional analyses complicate Shepherd’s normative
implications as well as prevailing wisdom. Specifically, results from
Tables 2 and 3 can certainly be understood to either exacerbate or reduce
worries about business’ potential undue influence. On the one hand, the
new findings may only deepen fears about elected state supreme court
justice decisions’ vulnerability to campaign contributions. After all, the
weight of the results from Table 1, 2, and 3 imply that the ability to
influence judicial votes extends far beyond pro-business efforts.
On the other hand, results illustrating that non- and anti-business
interests’ campaign contributions influenced judicial outcomes similar to
pro-business contributions may also, paradoxically, reduce overall
worries about the relation between judicial contributions and outcomes.
That is to say, evidence that any interest group willing and able to invest
in judicial campaigns can influence judicial outcomes might dilute fears
about the undue influence of any one particular group. While one may
reasonably feel uneasy about the influence of judicial campaign
contributions on judicial outcomes, perhaps some comfort flows from the
realization that any such influence is not limited to one particular
viewpoint (e.g., pro-business interests). Of course, it bears emphasis that
evidence of positive relations between pro-, non-, and anti-business
sources and favorable does not establish causation. Indeed, in this
particular context, a critical question that endures due to research design
and data limitations involves whether such evidence reflects selection or
141
See infra Table 1 (describing the mixed effects model of pro-business judicial campaign
contributions’ influence on judicial voting in business cases).
142
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 2.
143
See, e.g., Charles G. Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 46–47 (2003)
(explaining the finding that pro-business campaign contributions are destructive).
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inducement effects. That is, to take one example, the positive correlation
between pro-business campaign contributions to judicial candidates may
be a function of such contributions making it easier for pro-business
candidates to win their judicial elections or, in contrast, inducing winning
judges to reach pro-business outcomes.144
Important causal inference limitations notwithstanding, at the very
least what my results accomplish at an empirical level is to help place
Shepherd’s critique of businesses’ influence on state supreme courts into
a broader interpretative context and expand on what we know about the
influence of judicial campaign contributions and judicial outcomes. At a
normative level, one implication from my results is that while Shepherd’s
characterization of judicial campaign contributions as “destructive” 145
may still be apt, other vantage points may inject greater complexity and
granularity and, in so doing, persuasively frame alternative
characterizations of judicial campaign contributions that fall somewhere
between positions staked out by Professors Shepherd, on the one hand,
and Hall on another. 146
1.

From the Empirical to the Normative

Broadening the empirical debate to include evidence of the potential
influence of extra-legal factors on judicial outcomes from any campaign
contributor (pro-, non-, or anti-business) might help deflect the debate
from a focus on narrow empirical points to the more theoretical (and
decidedly non-empirical) question about whether, in the context of
campaign finance and free speech, judicial elections are different in kind
from non-judicial elections and, as such, whether they warrant different
legal treatment when it comes to campaign finance.147 Within this stilldeveloping normative debate, two factors deserve attention. One is that
even if one concedes the empirical point that pro-business contributions
do not have any monopolistic lock on helping secure favorable judicial
outcomes, non-business judicial contributions’ distinctive focus may
engender a similarly distinctive level of influence. A second factor
involves questions about whether legal doctrine, specifically laws

144
See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts:
The Empirical Relationship between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making,
44 J. LEGAL STUD. S161, S178 (2015) (observing Kang & Shepherd note a similar limitation to
their work as well).
145
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 2.
146
Compare SHEPHERD, supra note 103, with HALL, supra note 20.
147
See King & Shepherd, supra note 144, at S165 (observing that campaign spending has
increased dramatically and with it judicial elections have grown more competitive).
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governing public election campaign contributions, should treat judicial
elections differently than non-judicial elections.
2.

Pro-Business Contributions Overwhelm Non- and Anti-Business
Contributions

Even if one concedes that pro-, non-, and anti-business judicial
campaign contributions all possess the ability to influence favorable
judicial outcomes, it is plausible that the magnitude and nature of probusiness contributions make them comparatively more efficacious and,
thus, more worrisome. Business interests and lawyers (and law firms)
dominate financial contributions to state supreme court judges’ election
campaigns.148 Between 2000–09, business interests, broadly defined,
contributed more than $62.6 million, or thirty percent of all judicial
campaign contributions.149 Lawyers and lobbyists (principally plaintiff
lawyers and their agents) contributed $59.3 million, or another twentyeight percent of total judicial campaign contributions. 150 By contrast,
political campaign contributions to judges from unions are a small fraction
as compared to the donations from either business interests or lawyers
and lobbyists.151
Not only do campaign contributions from business interests exceed
those from all other discrete interest groups, but business interests’ legal
agendas are typically more focused and benefit from a clearer idea of
which judicial candidates business interests wish to target. 152 Legal (and
political) agendas advanced by lawyers and lobbyists, by contrast, are
typically far less focused and more diverse, reflecting the various interests
of a wide range of clients.153
On balance, business interests, through their campaign contributions,
are perhaps uniquely positioned to successfully exert influence of state
supreme court judges, particularly when these judges are called upon to
decide business cases. If so, pro-business contributions, as Kang and

148
See id. at S168–69 (discussing how campaign contributions from business interests result
in state supreme court judges favoring business litigants across a range of cases).
149
See SHEPHERD, supra note 103, at 1–2.
150
See id.
151
Cf. David Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 306 (2008) (noting
that unions are small but formidable contributors in the judicial election process).
152
See id. at 297 (stating that contributions from business interests are often more
substantial because these entities have more resources). See also id. at 306 (noting that
businesses have very narrow litigation interests, and thus, judicial candidates give deference
to these interests when businesses contribute to candidates judicial campaigns).
153
Cf. id. at 321 (discussing how lobbyists seeking judicial reform often advance
stakeholder interests).
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Shepherd emphasize, may indeed pose a special threat to a collective goal
for fair and impartial justice.
3.

When it Comes to the First Amendment Are Judicial Elections Simply
Different Than Other Elections?

Arguments abound about whether the judicial and traditional
political electoral contexts differ enough to warrant treating the judicial
campaign finance context differently than the non-judicial campaign
finance context.154 Hall, for example, argues that whatever differences
might exist they are insufficient to justify different legal treatment for the
judicial and non-judicial elections when it comes to campaign finance.155
Others, however, emphasize the differences between judicial and nonjudicial elections and call for different campaign finance rules. 156
Professor Shepherd, for example, argues that judicial campaigns are
particularly vulnerable to distortion (and implicitly distinct from nonjudicial elections) due to pro-business campaign contributions’ unique
role in judicial elections.157
Others share Kang and Shepherd’s conclusion but not their reasoning.
Professor Sample, for example, emphasizes the public’s different
democratic expectations for the courts and legislative branches and
concludes that these differing expectations justify treating judicial and
legislative campaign finance with different legal rules. 158 Professor Smith
similarly dwells on differences between the judicial and legislative
branches and notes that judicial elections can involve spending by
“specific litigants” or “specific cases” despite a public commitment to an
“impartial adjudicator.159 Smith contrasts the judicial context with the
legislative where, he notes, the public expects legislators to “(generally, at
154
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 144, at S164 (contrasting how reformers desired to
insulate judges from political and other pressures because judges were appointed to restrain
both the executive and legislative branches of government, however, a majority of states
adopted judicial elections).
155
See generally HALL, supra note 20.
156
See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 144, at S176–78 (arguing that the rules for judicial and
non-judicial elections should differ because ideology and campaign contributions heavily
influence judicial decision-making).
157
See id. at S167 (discussing how campaign contributions from business interests result in
state supreme court justices favoring business litigants across a range of cases).
158
See Sample, supra note 21, at 756–57 (opining that campaign contributions in judicial
elections should be treated differently than campaign contributions in other elections).
159
See Adam Liptak et al., Caperton and the Courts: Did the Floodgates Open?, 18 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 496 (2015) (stating that judicial elections differ from legislative
elections in that they focus on impartial adjudicators making decisions for specific litigants
and specific cases unlike legislative elections where the decisions of legislatures are guided
by what voters want).
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least) achieve the goals that the people who elected them wanted them to
do.”160
Apart from scholars’ perspectives, even some Supreme Court justices
appear to tilt in this direction. Writing for the Court in Williams-Yulee v.
Florida Bar, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that: “[j]udges are not politicians,
even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot.”161 Consequently,
in a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld a restriction on election speech and
fundraising for elected judges that would be “obviously” unconstitutional
if applied to other candidates for elected public office. 162 However, the
Court’s Williams-Yulee decision stands quite uneasily with the Court’s
prior decision in White which struck down a Minnesota law prohibiting
state judicial candidates from making public statements concerning
disputed legal or political issues incident to judicial campaigns. 163
Somewhat lost in the debate is the possible analytical purchase of a
distinction between using judicial campaign contributions to “buy” a
judicial vote as opposed to a judicial philosophy or general outlook.
Again, all surely agree that a campaign contribution that, quite literally,
pre-secures a specific judicial vote in a particular case—or even creates an
objectively unacceptable impression of judicial impropriety or bias—as
the Court’s decision in Caperton suggests, requires judicial recusal.164
4.

Efforts to Purchase a Judicial Philosophy Rather Than a Judicial
Outcome

More difficult, however, are judicial campaign contributions that do
not seek to pre-secure a specific judicial outcome in particular case in the
future but, instead, seek to promote a judicial philosophy, theory, or
outlook. If judicial campaign contributions in state elections simply reflect
support for a particular or general judicial philosophy, they quickly begin
to resemble the (albeit indirect) role that campaign contributions to
presidential candidates perform in federal election context.
While constitutional structure provides layers of separation between
the electorate and a federal judge or Supreme Court Justice’s appointment,
few serious observers contest the role that politics plays when it comes to
the selection of Article III judges and Justices. Indeed, in many ways our
constitutional structure (to say nothing of political accountability) is
See id.
135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015).
162
Id.
163
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2546 (2002) (holding that it is
impermissible for states to regulate or restrain candidate speech based on its content).
164
Cf. Pozen, supra note 151, at 303 (suggesting that the recusal system should be more
rigorous).
160
161
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designed to afford politics some role.165 Once one concedes, either as a
descriptive or normative (or both) matter, politics’ role in the selection of
federal judges, it logically follows that campaign contributions exert some
influence, even if indirect.
While the academic literature is festooned with research illustrating
the role of politics, particularly presidential politics, in federal judicial
appointments,166 a brief description of two recent (and still-evolving)
examples deserve brief mention. 167 First, Justice Scalia’s recent death
presaged a political firestorm fueled by President Obama’s decision to
appoint Judge Merrick Garland to fill the vacant Supreme Court seat. 168
(Now-former) President Obama’s status as a lame-duck, Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnelly’s assertion that the Senate would simply not
process any Supreme Court nominations so close to a presidential
election, and Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton’s refusal to
commit to re-appointing Judge Garland if she assumed the presidency
contributed to the political intrigue.169 As Professor Maltz recently noted,
the Garland nomination serves “as a graphic reminder of the influence of
presidential politics on the evolution of constitutional doctrine.” 170
Judge Garland’s nomination by a lame-duck president within one
year of a contested presidential election only heighted the electorate’s
attention to one likely outcome of the 2016 presidential election: [t]he

165
See id. (identifying various democratic benefits flowing from voters directly selecting
state judges).
166
See TERRI PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 122 (1999) (explaining how
presidents can gauge future judicial performance by carefully evaluating the political views
of potential nominees); JOHN MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 4 (1995)
(stating that the Senate has the authority to either confirm or reject presidential judicial
nominees); STEPHEN CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 70 (1994) (analyzing how the current process of selecting Supreme
Court Justices has become heavily political, which starkly contrasts how executive
administrations before the 1980s selected potential Justices).
167
See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (describing how presidential politics
heavily influence the nomination and appointment of Supreme Court Justices).
168
See Jonathan Adler, The Real Reason President Obama Won’t Recess-Appoint Merrick
POST,
(Dec.
29,
2016),
Garland
to
the
Supreme
Court,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/29/the-realreason-president-obama-wont-recess-appoint-merrick-garland-to-the-supreme-court/?utm
_term=.8be1cf3660b8 [https://perma.cc/X7VB-5ZWY] (discussing how President Obama
nominated Judge Merrick Garland to fill the late Justice Scalia’s Supreme Court seat).
169
See id. (stating that the Senate is not constitutionally obligated to consider nominees
appointed by the president).
170
Earl Maltz, The 2016 Election and the Future of Constitutional Law: The Lessons of 1968, 43
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 735, 735 (2016). But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Judicial Politics and
Decisionmaking: A New Approach, 70 VAND. L. REV. 2051, 2051 (2017) (experimental evidence
suggesting that judges are not “politicians in robes”).
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guarantee of one Supreme Court nomination and the not-implausible
opportunity for additional nominations. 171
And this latter observation leads to a second (albeit related)
example.172 During the recent presidential campaign, then-candidate
Trump publicly released two separate lists of individuals (totaling twentyone) whom he proclaimed during a televised presidential candidate
debate he would consider nominating to the United States Supreme
Court.173 Given the perception that the next U.S. president would likely
be in a position to fill at least one seat (by definition) and, more probably,
two or more seats, and that the next president would likely have a
significant influence on the development of future U.S. law, as Professor
Kidd et al. note: “[i]t is not surprising that Republicans wanted assurances
that their nominee would nominate someone whose jurisprudence would
match that of Scalia.”174 That is to say, then-candidate Trump (as well as
his opponent, Secretary Clinton), took pains to inform the electorate
throughout their campaigns about the “type” of judges and Justices they
planned to nominate if elected.175 Moreover, both campaigns overtly ran
campaign ads (negative and positive) and sought (and received)
campaign contributions expressly over the issue of their approach toward
judicial selections.176 Finally, not only did the two main presidential
candidates perceive (almost assuredly correctly) the need for (or strategic
political advantage of) discussing with the electorate what they would
look for in the potential judicial nominees, but the mainstream media

171
See id. at 736 (inferring that the president’s nomination extends beyond simply
appointing one Justice because both Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg are approaching the
age of retirement).
172
See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (suggesting that the 2016 presidential
election results would influence the judiciary for years to come because the next president
would likely appoint multiple Justices to the Supreme Court).
173
See Ed Whelan, Trump’s Supreme Court Candidates, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 9, 2016),
www.nationalreview.com/node/442036/print [https://perma.cc/PQ2D-2T4W] (listing
president-elect Trump’s twenty-one potential Supreme Court nominees).
174
See Maltz, supra note 170 (discussing why a democratic president would choose a
nominee who would side with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, whereas a
republican president would choose a nominee who would side with Justices Roberts,
Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy for years to come).
175
See Jonathan Adler, How Scalia-esque Will Donald Trump’s Supreme Court Nominee Be?,
WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2017/01/26/how-scalia-esque-will-donald-trumps-supreme-court-nominee-be/?utm_
term=.7331ad04d232 [https://perma.cc/2P8F-F3M2] (discussing president-elect Trump’s
plan to appoint judges very much in the mold of Justice Scalia).
176
Cf. NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL
COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 174 (Stanford Univ. Press 2005) (arguing that presidential
candidates have historically made the selection of justices and judges a campaign issue).
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reinforced the perception that the candidates’ approaches toward judicial
nominations were a legitimate and, indeed, important campaign issue. 177
Very few at the time voiced any concerns with the presidential
candidates’ open, consistent, and persistent discussion during the
campaign of what they would “look for” in their judicial nominees.178 If
anything, the opposite was the case.179 That is, the candidates, media, and,
likely, a sizable portion of the electorate, felt that such discussions were an
important part of the presidential campaign. 180 To be sure, what
happened during the most recent presidential election cycle (and similar
to many prior election cycles) involved action by those seeking positions
in the executive branch that possess the authority to nominate judges and
Justices—rather than those who aspired to Article III commissions.181 This
is, of course, an important distinction. 182 Distinction aside, however, one
question that endures is whether this constitutes enough of a distinction
to treat constitutional issues embedded in campaign finance laws
differently for state judicial elections and federal elections. 183
VI. CONCLUSION
To the extent that any campaign contribution in judicial elections
facilitates “buying” justice, an array of obvious problems arise. 184 Because
pro-, non-, and anti-business have demonstrated some (albeit slightly

177
Cf. Conor Friedersdorf, How a Hilary Clinton Presidency Would Affect the Supreme Court,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/how-ahillary-clinton-presidency-would-affect-the-supreme-court/501539/
[https://perma.cc/B2K9-K34U] (illustrating the importance of the Supreme Court
nomination process). See also Jim DeMint, DeMint: Gorsuch is a Model for Future Judicial
Nominations, THE HILL (Apr. 12, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/thejudiciary/328518-demint-gorsuch-is-a-model-for-future-judicial-nominations
[https://perma.cc/9383-9SWC] (inferring that president-elect Trump made his intentions to
nominate a certain type of Supreme Court candidate known to voters well in advance).
178
See id. (interpreting that voters were satisfied because they were able to essentially vote
for judicial candidates).
179
See id. (arguing that Supreme Court nominations are an important election issue).
180
Cf. Friedersdorf, supra note 177 (observing that discussions about Supreme Court
nominations are necessary and important).
181
See Vicki Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III
Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 977 (2007).
182
See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (explaining how business and political
party interests systematically influence judicial nominations, appointments, and decisionmaking).
183
Cf. Pozen, supra note 151, at 323 (suggesting that a change may be in the best interest of
voters and the judiciary).
184
Cf. Pamela Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1046 (2007) (discussing how
judicial campaign contributions make judges beholden to the economic interests of donors
and result in judges placing higher value on self-preservation as opposed to justice).
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different) systematic ability to influence judicial votes in business cases,
then, at the very least, one less problem emerges. While this one less
problem may not assuage some (or any) critics of pro-business campaign
contributions in judicial elections, it nonetheless remains important to
gain a full empirical picture before proceeding to contested normative and
theoretical issues incident to assessing First Amendment protection for
campaign contributions to judicial elections.
Additional empirical clarity on the relations between campaign
contributions and judicial votes, while helpful, does not, however, reduce
the difficulty of the related, and enduring, normative questions. To the
extent that this issue uncovers an inevitable collision of important values,
what remains is how best to reconcile these conflicting interests,185 and a
single way to reconcile these conflicts may not exist. As Professor Karlan
notes, “it is not categorically true that we want judges to ignore popular
opinion and rely on their own consciences, or that we want to protect
judges who ignore politically settled interpretations and rely on their own
views of the law. Sometimes we do and sometimes we don’t.”186 Given
this structural ambivalence, when it comes to narrower issues concerning
judicial campaign contributions, the late-Justice Scalia likely got it right
when he opined during the oral argument in White that: “[n]ow, [judicial
elections] may be a very bad idea, but as long as [the First Amendment is]
in your constitution, I find it hard to believe that it is a significant State
interest of Minnesota to prevent [judicial] elections from being
informed.”187

Cf. id. (concluding that solving the problems created by judicial campaigns can be
solved by recapturing impartial justice and the rule of law).
186
Karlan, supra note 184, at 1048.
187
Brief for Petitioner at 45, Republican Party of Minn. V. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No.
01-521).
185
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APPENDIX TABLE A1
Mean
Pro-business judge vote
Anti-business judge vote
Business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.) (raw)
Non-business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.)
(raw)
Anti-business campaign contrib. (% of ttl.)
(raw)
Total campaign contrib. ($10K) (raw)
Non-partisan judicial election
Partisan election
Democrat justice
Republican justice
State tort climate
State citizen ideology
State elite ideology
Business litigant was petitioner
Justice w/in 2 years of term end
Case strength

s.d.

0.50
0.50
19.32
59.15

(0.50)
(0.50)
(22.59)
(37.19)

10,804
10,804
10,607
10,607

3.54

(13.54)

10,607

40.91
0.41
0.18
0.42
0.46
-0.13
55.93
49.33
0.49
0.24
-0.02

(61.35)
(0.49)
(0.39)
(0.49)
(0.50)
(0.46)
(14.66)
(13.62)
(0.50)
(0.42)
(43.13)

10,607
16,083
16,083
16,083
16,083
16,078
16,078
16,078
16,083
16,083
7,112

SOURCES: Follow the Money; Shepherd (2013) data sets.
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